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"GOT MILK?".. . NOT TODAY: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
DEFENDS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
FOR SMALL DAIRY FARMERS

"[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and
tyrannical.
1

-Thomas

I.

Jefferson

INTRODUCTION
2

Everybody is familiar with the ubiquitous "Got Milk?" advertisements.
These ads, which feature a wide range of celebrities, such as Jason Kidd
and Britney Spears, wearing white milk moustaches, are part of one of the
3
most widely recognized campaigns in advertising history. What many
people do not realize is that compelled assessments, paid by dairy farmers,
fund these generic ads. 4 This funding scheme is the result of The Dairy
Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 ("Dairy Act").5 The federal government has other similar programs-commonly called check-off pro-

1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIous FREEDOM (1786).
2. For the official "Got Milk?" website, see http://www.got-milk.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
3. For examples of the celebrities featured in the advertising campaign, see
http://www.whymilk.com/celebrity-archive.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). See
also Claudia Kalb, Got (Enough)Milk?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 2005, at 58 (noting popularity of advertising campaign). Although the advertisements are extremely popular, this publicity has not translated into increased milk sales. See id. (stating that
milk consumption has fallen from high of forty-five gallons per person per year in
1945 to only twenty-two gallons at present time).
4. See Inst. for Justice, Cochran v. Veneman: I Challenges Government-Forced
Farmer Funding of "Got Milk?" Ads, at http://www.ij.org/first-amendment/got_
milk/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (describing source of funds).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4538 (2000). Section 4501 provides, in pertinent part:
It, therefore, is declared to be the policy of Congress that it is in the
public interest to authorize the establishment ... of an orderly procedure
for financing (through assessments on all milk produced in the United
States for commercial use and on imported dairy products) and carrying
out a coordinated program of promotion designed to strengthen the
dairy industry's position in the marketplace and to maintain and expand
domestic and foreign markets and uses for fluid milk and dairy products.
Id. § 4501 (b).

(1237)
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grams 6-for agricultural products such as honey, 7 beef 8 and pork, 9 which
use compelled assessments to fund generic industry advertisements.
Recently, various circuit courts have ruled on whether compelling
producers to fund advertisements to which they object violates the First
Amendment.1 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed this issue when it considered the validity of the Dairy Act in
Cochran v. Veneman.II The court held that the Dairy Act violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by compelling them to fund speech that they
found disagreeable, thus vindicating the free speech rights of small dairy
12
farmers who object to the "Got Milk?" advertisements.
The recent proliferation of appellate litigation over the constitutionality of these check-off programs derives from the Supreme Court's previ6. See Bret Fox, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-First Amendment Review of Beef Checkoff Assessments; Beef May Be for Dinner, But May Producers Be Compelled to Say So?, 4

Wyo. L. REv. 397, 397 (2004) ("The term 'checkoff refers to the fixed, per-unit fee
that producers are required by law to pay into the program each time they market
a unit of the pertinent commodity."). The fees generated from the check-off programs fund activities such as promotion and research. See id. (describing overall
uses of typical check-off programs).
7. Honey Research, Promotion, and Consumer Information Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 4601-4613 (2000).
8. Beef Research and Information Act of 1985 ("Beef Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 29012911 (2000).

9. Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1985 ("Pork
Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4819 (2000).
10. See Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that requiring alligator hunters and farmers to pay fees to fund generic
advertisements violated First Amendment), vacated and remanded by Landreneau v.
Pelts & Skins, LLC, 125 S.Ct. 2511 (2005) (vacating and remanding decision in
light ofJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. 2055 (2005)); Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's
decision that compelled assessments under the Pork Act violated First Amendment), vacated and remanded by Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Campaign for Family
Farms, 125 S.Ct. (2005) (vacating and remanding in light of Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass'n); Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 713 (8th
Cir. 2003) (declaring compelled assessments pursuant to Beef Act unconstitutional), vacated and remanded byJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. 2055
(2005) (vacating and remanding case in light of Court's ruling that Beef Act is

constitutional). For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 63-72 and
accompanying text.
The First Amendment to the Constitution is the citizens' primary protection
from governmental infringement on free speech. It states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. 359 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded byJohanns v. Cochran,
125 S.Ct. 2512 (2005) (vacating and remanding decision in light of Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n).
12. See id. at 279-80 (holding that Dairy Act "does not survive the First Amendment challenge lodged by Appellants Joseph and Brenda Cochran"). For a further
discussion of the Cochran holding, see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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ous vacillating approach to similar cases.1 3 In 1997, the Supreme Court
held that a statute forcing California fruit growers to fund generic industry
advertisements did not violate the First Amendment. 14 Four years later,
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute that obligated mushroom growers to pay for generic advertisements. 15 The Court distinguished the seemingly contradictory holdings by emphasizing the
different nature of the two assessment schemes. 16 The central analytical
distinction was that the assessment scheme in the valid statute was ancillary
to a comprehensive economic regulatory program, whereas the funding
scheme in the invalid statute was the main feature of the statute. 17 These
rulings left lower courts with the task of deciding whether similar statutes
are closer to the former statutory scheme or the latter. 18 This past term,
given the lingering confusion, the Supreme Court made what appears to
be a final attempt to sort out this area of law: it decided an appeal regard-

13. Before the Third Circuit decided Cochran, the Supreme Court had twice
decided similar cases, reaching opposite results. Compare United States v. United
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 404, 415-16 (2001) (announcing that Mushroom Promotion,
Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 was repugnant to First Amendment), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470-74 (1997)
(ruling that compelled assessment to fund generic advertisements pursuant to Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 did not violate First Amendment
rights of growers, handlers and processors of California fruit trees). For a further
discussion on the Supreme Court's holding in Glickman and United Foods, see infra
notes 25-62 and accompanying text. See also Shannon P. Duffy, US Can't Milk Farmers for Funds for Dairy Campaign: Not Cowed by Precedents, 3rd Circuit Distinguishes a
Line of Cases, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 2004, at 1 (stating that Third Circuit's
task in Cochran was to determine why Supreme Court ruled one way in Glickman
and another way in United Foods).
14. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 476-77 (upholding statute because First Amendment is not basis for viewing economic regulations, which is area where Court
shows Congress "[a]ppropriate respect"). The statute at issue in Glickman was the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (2000). For a
further discussion of Glickman, see infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
15. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416 (declaring that assessments pursuant to
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 did not
pass constitutional muster). For a further discussion of UnitedFoods, see infra notes
49-62 and accompanying text.
16. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412 ("The features of the marketing scheme
found important in Glickman are not present in the case now before us."). For a
further discussion of the Supreme Court's distinguishing rationale, see infra notes
58-62 and accompanying text.
17. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12 (recognizing essential difference between regulatory schemes in Glickman and United Foods).
18. See Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir.
2003) ("[T] he constitutionality of the Pork Act turns on whether pork is more like
mushrooms or more like peaches."), vacated and remanded by Mich. Pork Producers
Ass'n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. (2005); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (elucidating distinction
between United Foods and Glickman rationales). For a further list of examples, see
supra note 10.
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ing the constitutionality of the Beef Research and Promotion Act in
Johanns v. Livestock MarketingAss'n.19
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's recent analysis of the constitutionality of compelled assessments for generic advertising in the context of the Dairy Act. 20 Part II summarizes the prior Supreme Court
precedent and recent analysis by other circuit courts pertaining to similar
statutes.2 1 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's approach to such statutes. 22 Finally, Part IV explores the impact that the Third Circuit's analysis will have on the free speech rights of those who are compelled to fund
similarly drafted programs. 23 While seemingly large at first, the impact of
the Third Circuit's decision has been largely limited in light of the Su24
preme Court's latest check-off program decision.

II.

SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT COURT JURISPRUDENCE

A.
1.

PriorPertinent Supreme Court Precedent

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Eliott, Inc.

The Supreme Court's initial encounter with the First Amendment implications of agricultural check-off programs came in the 1997 case of
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Eliott, Inc.25 The statute at issue in the case
19. 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005) (resolving question of constitutionality of Beef Act,
setting precedent that implicates many similar acts). This was the Court's third
time in eight years that it had to decide upon the constitutionality of a check-off
program.
20. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's check-off program jurisprudence, see infra notes 75-155 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, see infra
notes 25-74 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of Third Circuit jurisprudence, see infra notes 75-155 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit's decision and current
state of this area of jurisprudence in general, see infra notes 156-79 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the limiting effect on free speech resulting from the
Supreme Court's very recent check-off opinion, see infra notes 156-79 and accompanying text. For an example of some of the early predictions about the impact of
the Cochran decision that ultimately proved false, see Jim Edwards, Got Milk? (Got
Mess): A Legal Battle over Food Marketing "Checkoffs" Threatens to Eliminate $ 700 Million
in Annual Spending on Everythingfrom Milk and Produce to Cotton. Here's the Story of
Madison Avenue's Unlikely Fight with American Farmers, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 63811440 (postulating potential impact of Cochran).
25. 521 U.S. 457, 460-61 (1997) ("The question presented to us is whether the
requirement that respondents finance such generic advertising is a law 'abridging
the freedom of speech' within the meaning of the First Amendment."); see also
Steve Simpson, We're Talking Here: Speech Is Speech, Even When It Comes in CommerceLike the "Got Milk?" Ads Now Before the 3rd Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at 44
(noting that, before Third Circuit heard Cochran, Supreme Court dealt with this
issue twice in context of agricultural promotion programs, once in Glickman and
once in United Foods).
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26
Pursuwas the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).
ant to the AMAA, marketing orders may be promulgated; these marketing
orders supplant competition in many markets and take the form of economic regulation. 27 The Court noted that "[c]ollective action, rather
than the aggregate consequences of independent competitive choices" ex28
emplifies the markets under the AMAA.

In Glickman, a large California fruit producer challenged the constitutionality of the AMAA after the producer was required to pay for a generic
29
In evaluating the
California fruit advertisement pursuant to the statute.
constitutionality of the statute, the Court considered whether the compelled funding was a "First Amendment issue . . . or simply a question of
30
In reaching
economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve."
its decision, the Court noted that it is extremely important to look at the
overall statutory context. 3 ' The Glickman Court found that the AMAA
contained three characteristics that distinguished it from laws that it previ32
First, the AMAA
ously struck down as violative of the First Amendment.
scheme did not prevent the producers from conveying any message to any
audience.3 3 The Court noted that this fact distinguished Glickman from its
34
line of cases pertaining to "commercial speech."
Commercial speech, as opposed to public discourse, first received formal protection from the Court nearly thirty years ago, and it protects ad35
vertisers' ability to freely communicate with their intended audience.
26. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (2000). Section 602 states, in pertinent part, that the
purpose of the AMAA is "to establish and maintain .. . orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce." Id. § 602(1).
27. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461-62 (describing specific workings of marketing
orders and entire AMAA). The AMAA marketing orders remove competition from
various markets and may take numerous forms, such as: (1) supplying a uniform
price for all producers in a common market; (2) specifying the quantity and grade
of the commodity that can be marketed; (3) disposing surplus in an orderly manner; and (4) authorizing joint research and development projects and inspection
projects. Id. at 461. These marketing orders were "expressly exempted from the
antitrust laws." Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 608b).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 461-64 (stating facts).
30. Id. at 468.
31. See id. at 469 ("In answering [this] question we stress the importance of
the statutory context in which [the legal question] arises.").
32. See id. at 469-70 (listing distinguishing characteristics).
33. See id. at 469 (noting producers' ability to communicate any message that
they wanted).
34. See id. at 469 n.12 (providing list of Court's "commercial speech" precedent); see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 571-72 (1979) (deciding that regulation completely banning promotional advertising by electrical utility company violates First Amendment).
35. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (announcing that speech which does "'no more than propose
a commercial transaction"' retains First Amendment protection) (citation omitted). For a discussion of the primary test-the Central Hudson test-used to evaluate commercial speech cases, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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The rationale behind protecting commercial speech, such as commercial
advertising, was that it disseminates information the public needs to make
informed decisions and efficiently allocate resources. 36 Commercial
speech, however, does not enjoy full First Amendment protection and may
be restricted under certain circumstances, which the Court found inappli37
cable to Glickman.
Second, the Court noted that the AMAA did not compel participation
in any "actual or symbolic" speech, and it declared that this distinguished
the AMAA marketing orders from the Court's body of law on compelled
speech and compelled association. 38 The Court previously emphasized
that a First Amendment violation occurs when people are forced to repeat
an ideological government message with which they disagree, or are
forced to use their private property to communicate a personally disagreeable ideological message. 39 Compelled assessments for generic advertise36. See id. at 765 (explaining rationale behind commercial speech). Justice
Blackmun stated quite eloquently:
Advertising... is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.... Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not
say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Id.; see also Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 4 (2000) (distinguishing commercial speech from public discourse). Public discourse is a more highly valued form of speech, because it is viewed as "a
valuable way of participating in democratic self-determination." Id. Robert Post
effectively analyzes the main principles deduced from Justice Blackmun's opinion.
See id. at 8-15 (summarizing principles derived from Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy).
37. For a discussion of the current test used to determine when commercial
speech may be restricted, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
38. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469 n.13 (listing distinguished cases); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking down statute that
compelled school children to recite pledge of allegiance).
39. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New
Hampshire violated appellees' First Amendment rights by requiring them to display state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates). The Court in Maynard
recognized that a necessary corollary to freedom of speech is the freedom to not
speak. See id. at 714 ("The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of
mind.'") (citation omitted). Even if the State's interest is legitimate, the Court
noted that the individual's First Amendment rights weigh heavily against that interest. See id. at 717 ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no
matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message."); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
559 (1995) (announcing that State cannot force private citizens organizing parade
to include group that endorses message that organizers find disagreeable); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (1943) (ruling that West Virginia State Board of Education
resolution requiring all students and teachers to participate in flag salute and
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ments, however, do not require the contributors themselves to speak or
display a message-thus, the Court found this line of precedent inapposite
to the regulatory scheme in Glickman.4"
Finally, the Court highlighted the fact that the regulatory scheme did
not "compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views." 41 The Court felt that this fact distinguished this case from a
line of cases, including Keller v. State Bar of California,4 2 in which it recognized First Amendment violations arising from statutes that compel an individual to fund personally disagreeable ideological speech. 43 The Court,
pledge of allegiance activities "invade [d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control"). See generally Edward J. Schoen et al., United Foods and Wileman
Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't,
39 Am. Bus. L.J. 467, 470-75 (2002) (providing background summary of Barnette/
Maynard line of Supreme Court cases).
40. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470-71 (asserting that Court's "compelled speech
case law" is "clearly inapplicable" to case at bar).
41. Id. at 469.

42. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). In Keller, attorneys challenged the California Bar's policy of using compulsory dues to fund political and ideological activities. Id. at 4.
The Court found that the use of the mandatory dues in this case violated the attorneys' First Amendment rights. Id. at 14. The Court explained that mandatory
dues can be used to fund activities necessarily and reasonably related to the purpose of regulating the legal profession, which is improving the quality of the legal
field. Id. at 14.
43. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470 n.14 (distinguishing prior precedent). This
"compelled speech" line of cases, which recognized the free speech protections
against forcing individuals to fund political or ideological speech, began with InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Street, the Court held
that a union could not finance political campaigns or ideas against the "expressed
wishes of a dissenting employee, with his exacted money." Id. at 770. On the other
hand, the Court held that union dues could be used to fund the collective bargaining process. See id. at 768 (noting that while Court does not define precise limits of
union's power to spend exacted money, compelling funding of disagreeable political ideas is beyond that limit). The Court distinguished between the use of compelled funds for activities central to the reason why Congress felt unions
acceptable in the first place (i.e., expenses for negotiations or administrative
costs). See id. ("In other words, it is a use which falls clearly outside the reasons
advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress why authority to make unionshop agreements was justified.").
The next case in this line of precedent is Abood v. Detroit Boardof Education, 431
U.S. 209 (1977), which was abrogated on other grounds. The issue in Abood was
whether government employees represented by a union, even though they are not
union members, may be forced to pay fees equivalent to union dues as a condition
for employment. See id. at 211 (presenting issue). This arrangement is called a
"union-shop." See id. (explaining fee arrangement). The Court upheld this arrangement, citing the importance of the union-shops to Congress's established system of labor relations. Id. at 222. The compelled fees were deemed acceptable
because they were used for the central purposes that justified forming the group
relationship in the first place. See id. ("'The furtherance of the common cause
leaves some leeway for the leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote
the cause which justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees with the group's strategy.'"
(quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 778)). Justice Stewart affirmed the principle that mem-
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however, opined in Glickman that these cases did not provide a blanket

rule preventing all compelled financial support for any "organization that
conducts expressive activities." 4 4 Instead, the Court asserted that its prior
decisions "provide affirmative support for the proposition that assessments
to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to pay for
speech over the objection of some members of the group."4 5 In accordance with the Keller line of cases, the Court asserted that compelled assessments to fund group activities are constitutional, as long as they are
used for activities "germane" to the goals of the group thatjustify the association, and are not used to fund ideological activities outside these cen6
tral goals.4
Examining the facts of Glickman, the Court determined that generic
advertising was "germane" to the stated reason of the marketing orders,
namely, maintaining orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural products, and that the assessments did not fund activities of an
ideological nature. 47 It then concluded that the marketing orders were a
type of congressional economic regulation that should enjoy a "strong pre48
sumption of validity" and held that the orders were constitutional.
bers cannot be compelled to contribute towards political candidates or ideas "unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." Id. at 234. Justice
Stewart also noted that unions could still spend money on political ideas, as long as
the dues are paid by non-objecting members who are not coerced to pay at the
threat of losing theirjobs. See id. at 235-36 (explaining rationale).
The Court's next compelled speech case, Keller, also protected against
mandatory contributions for political or ideological speech. See Keller, 496 U.S. 1,
14 (1990) (stating holding). The petitioners in Keller urged that the State Bar
infringed on their First Amendment rights by using membership dues to fund certain political and ideological endeavors. See id. at 4 (stating facts). The Court extended its Abood analysis to these facts, holding that the State Bar may "fund
activities germane to those goals [of compelled association] out of the mandatory
dues of all members," including the central reason for having a State Bar-improving the quality of legal services. See id. at 13-14 (extending Abood analytical approach to Keller). The State Bar, however, cannot "in such manner fund activities
of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity." Id. at 14. For
background on this trilogy of cases, see Schoen et al., supra note 39, at 475-79.
44. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471.
45. See id. at 472-73 (applying Keller test to facts of Glickman and asserting assessments in this case were valid).
46. See id. at 473 (summarizing central principles derived from Abood and Keller). So, for example, the State Bar in Keller can fund activities out of mandatory
dues that further the interest in regulating the legal industry and increasing the
quality of legal services, because those goals are germane to the reason a State Bar
is justified. See id. (delineating activities that State Bar may and may not fund).
47. See id. (averring that Glickman was "clearly" harmonious with Keller test
because "(1) the generic advertising of California peaches and nectarines [was]
unquestionably germane to the purposes of the marketing orders and, (2) in any
event, the assessments [were] not used to fund ideological activities").
48. Id. at 477 (finding no sufficient reason for overriding judgment of
legislators).
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United States v. United Foods

49
Four years later, in United States v. United Foods, the Supreme Court
held that a similar compelled assessment scheme for generic advertising
imposed on mushroom industry members did, in fact, violate the First
Amendment. 50 The Court began its analysis by recalling the origin of the
"commercial speech" doctrine, and then noted that it had previously used
a lesser standard of review for commercial speech than for other speech,
51
This lesser standard of scrutiny, derived
such as purely private speech.
from the Supreme Court case of CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub52
has received much criticism since its
lic Service Commission of New York,
53
By holding that the assessments at issue in United Foods were
inception.
unconstitutional even under the lesser standard of scrutiny, the Court
54
sidestepped the issue of whether the Central Hudson test was still valid.

49. 533 U.S. 404 (2001).
50. See id. at 416 (holding assessments are not permitted under First Amendment). The statute in question was the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6112 (2000). The Act states:
It is declared to be the policy of Congress that it is in the public interest
to authorize the establishment, through the exercise of powers provided
in this chapter, of an orderly procedure for developing, financing
through adequate assessments on mushrooms produced domestically or
imported into the United States, and carrying out, an effective, continuous, and coordinated program of promotion, research, and consumer
and industry information designed to(1) strengthen the mushroom industry's position in the marketplace;
(2) maintain and expand- existing markets and uses for mushrooms; and
(3) develop new markets and uses for mushrooms.
Id. § 6101(b).
51. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409 (denoting origin and rationale of commercial speech and lesser standard of scrutiny that has historically been applied to
commercial speech). The Court defined commercial speech as "speech that does
no more than propose a commercial transaction." Id.
52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409 (detailing instances of criticism of Central
Hudson test); see also Glickman, 521 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting
CentralHudson test and corresponding notion that commercial speech should generally be given less weight); Post, supranote 36, at 34-57 (analyzing and criticizing
Central Hudson test). Robert Post blames the Central Hudson test for "prematurely
stunt[ing] the evolution of the doctrine" of commercial speech. Id. at 55. The
test, as phrased by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson, is as follows:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
54. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("We need not
enter into the controversy, for even viewing commercial speech as entitled to lesser
protection, we find no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to sustain the compelled assessments sought in this case."). Additionally, the govern-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 5 [2005], Art. 4
1246

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 1237

The United Foods Court next considered its precedent concerning
compelled subsidies for speech and determined that the case did implicate the First Amendment because the mushroom producers disagreed
with the subsidized advertisements. 55 The advertisements conveyed the
message that all mushrooms are the same, and the complaining producers
wanted their mushrooms viewed as superior. 56 Although this disagreement may seem minor, it does not negate the risk to First Amendment
5 7
rights affected by such government compelled subsidies.
The Court established that Glickman was not controlling because,
even though the respective statutes contained similarities, there was one
fundamental difference 58 -the assessments in Glickman were "ancillary" to
the comprehensive marketing program while the advertising under the
mushroom scheme was "far from being ancillary," instead it was the main
object of the regulation. 59 Once again, the Court invoked the central
holding of its Keller decision, which compels objecting group members to
subsidize speech that is "germane to the larger regulatory purpose which
ment did not rely on the Central Hudson test in its appeal. See id. (indicating that
Court did not have to address Central Hudson question because government failed
to rely on it in its brief).
55. See id. at 410-11 (reciting starting point for analysis).
56. See id. at 411 (referring to respondent's main disagreement with generic
industry advertising scheme).
57. See id. (recognizing fact that First Amendment scrutiny must still be
passed despite fact that disagreement with speech produced by compelled contributions may seem minor). The Court stated:
First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel
a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies
for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no apparent principle
which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a branded
mushroom is better than just any mushroom. As a consequence, the
compelled funding for the advertising must pass First Amendment
scrutiny.
Id.
58. See id. (indicating that Glickman is not controlling to outcome of case at
bar).
59. See id. at 411-12 (distinguishing statutory scheme found in Glickman with
Mushroom Act). Once again, the Court emphasized the importance of taking the
whole statutory context into account for analytical purposes. See id. at 412 (citing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 455, 469 (1997)) (noting importance of looking at "entire regulatory program"). The Court noted some of the
critical factors of the statutory context in Glickman, including that the marketing
orders "'displaced competition"' and that the fruit producers were bound together in collective action. See id. (recounting key statutory factors that led Court
to decide Glickman in manner it did) (citation omitted). This led the Court to
believe that mandatory contributions to the advertising scheme in Glickman were a
"logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation." Id. The features
that the Court found important in Glickman were not found in the Mushroom Act
scheme, namely because the mandatory assessments in the case at bar were used
exclusively for the purposes of generic advertising. See id. (stating differences between respective schemes). The mushroom growers were "not forced to associate
as a group which makes cooperative decisions." Id.
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justified the required association." 60 After noting that it never upheld
compelled funding for speech where the speech itself is the primary object
of the program, the Court stated that holding "speech is germane to itself'
61
The factual distinction
would empty the Keller line of cases of meaning.
between Glickman and United Foods left much room for the lower courts to
62
interpret other similar check-off programs.
B.

Recent Analysis by Other Circuit Courts

Multiple circuit courts have reviewed the constitutionality of similar
check-off programs. 63 For instance, the Sixth Circuit recently decided
64
that the Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act
65
The court determined that the Pork
("Pork Act") was unconstitutional.
Act was "nearly identical" to the Mushroom Act at issue in United Foods
66
In effect, the Pork
and, accordingly, found that precedent controlling.
67
The Sixth Circuit
Act's only purpose was to promote the pork industry.
also refused to apply the lesser standard of scrutiny for commercial speech
found in the Central Hudson test.6 8
60. See id. at 414 (applying central holding of Keller to facts of United Foods).
The Court stated that its Abood/Keller line of cases stands for a broader principle
than what may have been extracted from its opinion in Glickman. See id. at 413
(indicating broader reading of Abood). The Court stated:
We did say in Glickman that Abood "recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.'" ... We take
further instruction, however, from Abood's statement that speech need
not be characterized as political before it receives First Amendment
Protection.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit has recently explained the overarching principle to take
from United Foods quite lucidly. See Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d
423, 433 (5th Cir. 2004) ("When the government binds individuals into a collective
association, the government can also require that those persons subsidize speech
germane to the purpose underlying the association."), vacated and remanded by Landreneau v. Pelts & Skins, LLC, 125 S.Ct. 2511 (2005) (vacating and remanding on
other grounds).
61. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415 (indicating that to hold speech that is
germane to itself would deplete Abood and Keller of any significance).
62. For a discussion of recent circuit court decisions concerning the constitutionality of check-off programs, see infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
63. For a list of recent appellate cases, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
64. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4819 (2000).
65. See Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir.
2003) (affirming district court's ruling that Pork Act violated First Amendment
protections), vacated and remanded by Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Campaign for
Family Farms, 125 S.Ct. (2005).
66. See id. at 162-63 (noting statutory similarities between Pork Act and Mushroom Act, which Supreme Court held unconstitutional in United Foods).
67. See id. at 163 (stating that promotion was sole purpose of Pork Act).
68. See id. (asserting that CentralHudson test was inapplicable). The Sixth Circuit highlighted the difference between this type of case and the typical commer-
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Similarly, in reviewing the constitutionality of the Beef Promotion
and Research Act of 198569 ("Beef Act"), the Eighth Circuit held that the
Beef Act was materially the same as the Mushroom Act at issue in United
Foods, and that the commercial speech was the principal object of the statute.7 0 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, however, the Eighth Circuit determined
that the CentralHudson test was applicable to assess the constitutionality of
check-off programs. 7 1 Applying that test, the court still found the program violative of the First Amendment because the government's interest
in promoting the economic health of the beef industry was not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the free speech restrictions. 72 The Supreme Court
73
Thus, the congranted certiorari to review the Eighth Circuit's holding.
topic" when
a
"hot
was
already
stitutionality of various check-off programs
74
program.
Act's
Dairy
the
of
validity
the
on
decided
Circuit
the Third
cial speech cases. See id. (distinguishing situation in Pork Act where producers
forced to express disagreeable message with typical commercial speech case where
limit is placed on ability of producers to express certain message). In Michigan
Pork Producers Ass'n, the plaintiffs were compelled to express a disagreeable message. See id. ("Even assuming that the advertising funded by the Act is indeed
commercial speech, the more lenient standard of review applied to limits on commercial speech has never been applied to speech-commercial or otherwise-that
is compelled."). The court went on to state, "[i]t is one thing to force someone to
close her mouth; it is quite another to force her to become a mouthpiece." Id. As
a consequence, the court deemed the Pork Act unconstitutional, governed by the
analysis set forth in United Foods. See id. (stating holding).
69. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 713 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 unconstitutional), vacated and remanded
byJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. 2055 (2005).
70. See id.at 717 (analogizing Mushroom Act to Beef Act and finding substantial similarity, thus making United Foods controlling).
71. See id. at 721-22 (deciding that Central Hudson test was appropriate). The
court noted that the Supreme Court in Glickman did not directly address the
proper standard and, thus, there was no complete answer. See id. at 722 (noting
lack of definitive answer by Supreme Court regarding whether CentralHudson test
was appropriate). The Eighth Circuit believed, however, that if the government
relied on the Central Hudson test in United Foods, that the Supreme Court would
have applied the Central Hudson test to the facts of the case. Id. The court acknowledged the factual differences between CentralHudson and the case at barnamely, that Central Hudson involved a restriction on speech while the case at bar
involved compelled speech. See id. (acknowledging factual distinctions). Despite
this difference, the court still found CentralHudson to be apposite. See id. ("In our
view, it is more significant that Central Hudson and the case at bar both involve
government interference with private speech in a commercial context.").
72. See id. at 725-26 (finding Beef Act unconstitutional under Central Hudson
test).
73. SeeVeneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004) (agreeing to
hear Beef Act case).
74. For a discussion of recent appellate court decisions preceding Cochran
that addressed the constitutionality of compelled funding under check-off programs, see supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
Additionally, after the Cochran decision, the Fifth Circuit released a similar
opinion striking down a Louisiana law that required alligator hunters and farmers
to pay various fees, some of which went to the funding of generic advertising that
the appellants found objectionable. See Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365
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THIRD CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE

A.

United States v. Frame

The Third Circuit had once before considered the constitutionality of
an agricultural check-off program.7 5 Before deciding Cochran v. Veneman,
the Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a check-off program
fifteen years earlier in United States v. Frame.76 The Third Circuit decided
77
Framewell before the Supreme Court decided Glickman and United Foods.
In Frame, the court analyzed the forced subsidies in accordance with the
Beef Act-the same statute that both the Eighth Circuit and Supreme
Court recently analyzed. 78 The Third Circuit held that the mandatory advertising assessments promulgated pursuant to the Beef Act did not violate
79
the First Amendment rights of disagreeing farmers.
F.3d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that using fees to fund generic advertising
violated First Amendment), vacated and remanded by Landreneau v. Pelts & Skins,
LLC, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005). Noting the contrasting Supreme Court precedents in
Glickman and United Foods, the Fifth Circuit had to "'determine whether Louisiana
alligator producers [were] more like mushroom producers than like peach producers."' Id. at 432 (quoting Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Jenkins, 259 F. Supp. 2d 482,
483 (M.D. La. 2003)). The Fifth Circuit held that the alligator marketing program
resembled United Foods more than Glickman because the "alligator producers are
not part of a collective association akin to Glickman's marketing cooperative." Id.
at 433. The court held that program violated the First Amendment, even though a
majority of the funds went to other programs beyond the generic marketing. See
id. at 434 (finding fact that substantial funds went to other programs besides advertising was not dispositive). The Fifth Circuit so held because the "key element of
Glickman" was absent, which is the lack of a "highly collectivized marketing association." Id.
75. See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (analyzing First
Amendment implications of Beef Promotion Act), abrogated by Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004)
76. Id.
77. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Glickman and
United Foods, see supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text.
78. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1121-22 (presenting issue). For a further discussion
of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Livestock Marketing Ass'n, finding the Beef Act
unconstitutional, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision that the Beef Act is constitutional, see
infra notes 160-77 and accompanying text.
79. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1122 (upholding district court's determination that
no constitutional provisions were violated). The Third Circuit began its analysis in
Frame by presenting the necessary background into the statutory and regulatory
scheme. Id. at 1122-24. Among the notable features was that the Beef Promotion
and Research Program does not receive direct federal funding. Id. at 1122. Congress enacted the Beef Promotion Act as a "self-help" measure for the beef industry
to stimulate its own markets. See id. (explaining congressional purpose for Act).
The Act permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate orders to establish
the "self-help" program and provide for its funding through mandatory assessments. See id. (explaining Secretary of Agriculture's role). For the factual and
procedural background, see id. at 1124-25.
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Recognizing that the Supreme Court had positively conferred upon
citizens the right to refrain from speaking, 80 the court noted that compelled contributions to groups who participate in speech implicates First
Amendment liberties.8 ' Next, the Third Circuit addressed the government's argument that the assessments funded "government speech," a category of speech that does not violate dissenting persons' First Amendment
rights. 82 Government speech receives unique protection because a repre-

sentative government that speaks on behalf of the whole population is
bound to have dissenters; these dissenters have the opportunity to hold
elected officials accountable through the political process. 83 The Frame
court decided, however, that the compelled funding of speech under the
Beef Act was not government speech. 84 The court's main thrust was that
the Cattleman's Board, the group compelling the funding, represents
a narrower population than does the government-the Board represents only a small segment of the population holding common
85
interests, whereas the government represents the whole population.
80. See id. at 1130 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). For further detail on this line
of Supreme Court precedent, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
81. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1130 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1977)); see also Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1066 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that requiring students to fund outside corporation that participates in lobbying
violated First Amendment rights of disagreeing students).
82. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1131-33 (addressing "government speech" argument); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)
("[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker.., or instances.., in which the government 'used
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.'")
(citation omitted).
83. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1131 ("Indeed, citizens of a country with a representative form of government have agreed to elect individuals to official posts who
will, and must, speak and act on behalf of the entire population, including on
behalf of those who disagree with all or some of the government's programs."); see
also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 54142 ("'When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry
objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position."' (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
235 (2000))). Additionally, another rationale is that the nexus between any government message and a dissenting individual is attenuated. See Frame, 885 F.2d at
1132 (contrasting attenuated nexus of government speech with closer nexus between individual and publicly identified group, such as union in Abood).
84. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132 (rejecting government speech argument).
85. See id. at 1132-34 (applying government speech rationale to present facts
and finding them incompatible). The Third Circuit relied heavily on Justice Powell's concurrence in Abood for its analysis. See id. at 1131-34 (examining Justice
Powell's concurrence in Abood). Most important was Powell's footnote thirteen to
that concurrence, in which Justice Powell stated the following:
Compelled support of private association is fundamentally different from
compelled support of government. Clearly, a board does not need to
demonstrate a compelling state interest every time it spends a taxpayer's
money in ways the taxpayer finds abhorrent. But the reason for permithttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss5/4
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held

that

the Act

must pass

First Amendment

Because the appellant, Frame, conceded that the advertising was commercial speech-a lesser protected category-the Third Circuit applied
87
In doing
the less exacting CentralHudson test as the standard of scrutiny.
showed
the
state
whether
(1)
factors:
following
so the court evaluated the
technique
regulatory
the
whether
(2)
interest";
a "substantial government
was proportional to the interest; and (3) whether "the incursion on com88
A
mercial speech [was] 'designed carefully to achieve the State's goal.'
free
to
be
right
his
asserted
Frame
because
arose
competing concern also
8 9
As
from compelled association-pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.
of
scrutiny
level
a
higher
deserved
claim
his
felt
a result, the Third Circuit
90
Despite the heavy burdens
than the typical commercial speech claim.
government interthe
substantial
that
found
court
the
on the government,
slight encroachthe
outweighed
markets
beef
strong
est in maintaining
ment on free speech rights. 9 1
92
She did not think that the
Judge Sloviter wrote a vehement dissent.
Beef Act was a regulatory program, and argued that the advertising of a
product alone "[did] not fit within the accepted meaning of 'regulation.' 9 3 Additionally, she felt that the Act was not carefully tailored because the burden on speech was greater than necessary in light of the

ting the government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money
on controversial projects is that the government is representative of the
people. The same cannot be said of a union, which is representative only
of one segment of the population, with certain common interests. The
withholding of financial support is fully protected in this context.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13.
86. See Frame,885 F.2d at 1133 (agreeing with Justice Powell's analysis).
87. See id. (announcing use of Central Hudson test).
88. See id. (listing elements of Central Hudson test).
89. For a further discussion on the Supreme Court precedent concerning
compelled association, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
90. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133-34 (noting that appellant's assertion was supported by Supreme Court's Abood decision, thus exacting higher scrutiny). Judge
Scirica, writing for the majority, stated that the court would only uphold the Beef
Promotion Act if it served "compelling state interests, that are ideologically neutral, and that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of free
speech or associational freedoms." Id. at 1134.
91. See id. at 1134-37 (balancing opposing interests and deciding in favor of
government). The majority also noted that the appellant's disagreement over the
advertisements was merely over strategy. See id. at 1137 (stating same). Judge
Sloviter, in her dissent, stated that the reason for objecting was totally irrelevant.
See id. at 1145 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("I believe it is immaterial whether Frame's
objection is for ideological reasons or libertarian ones, or even whether such reasons may also be in part colored by economic considerations.").
92. See id. at 1143-49 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (refuting majority's constitutional analysis).
93. Id. at 1144 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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government's general interest in the welfare of the beef trade. 9 4 She also
disagreed with the compelled nature of the funding, even if the speech
could be classified as "commercial."9 5 Then, applying the Central Hudson
test, Judge Sloviter concluded that the government's "general interest in
the health of the beef industry" was not substantial enough to justify the
forced payments, thus failing even under a lower level of scrutiny and negating the need for Judge Slovitor to enter into an analysis under the
more stringent compelled association standard. 96 Framewas the Third Circuit's last check-off program decision until it decided Cochran v.

Veneman.

97

B.

Cochran v. Veneman

In Cochran, the Third Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the
Dairy Act, 98 which compelled small dairy farmers to fund the famous "Got
Milk?" advertisements. 99 The appellants, Brenda and Joseph Cochran,
were small dairy farmers who did not belong to any dairy marketing or
manufacturing cooperatives and were required to pay assessments to fund
the "Got Milk?" advertisements. 10 0 The Cochrans practiced "traditional"
farming methods, a different procedure for producing milk than that used
by most large commercial milk farmers.10 1 The Cochrans felt that "tradi94. See id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (criticizing lack of narrow tailoring of
scheme); see also id. at 1147 (Sloviter,J., dissenting) ("While the government has a
general interest in the health of the beef industry, it does not follow that the government has a substantial interest in compelling the beef industry to make and
support such a promotion campaign.").
95. See id. at 1145 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("It can no more compel me to
advertise a product on ... my home than it can compel me to carry a similar sign
on... my jacket. Similarly, it cannot compel me to contribute my money to permit a private group to perform that function.").
96. See id. at 1146-48 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing significant govemnment interest in anti-smoking ads from statute in question).
97. 359 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded byJohanns v. Cochran,
125 S. Ct. 2512 (2005) (vacating and remanding on government speech grounds).
98. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4538 (2000). For a quotation of the Dairy Act, see supra
note 5.
99. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 266 (framing issue as "whether a federal statute
may compel a small dairy farm in Pennsylvania to help pay for the white-mustache
milk advertisements and other dairy promotions"). The compelled assessments
also finance the popular "Ahh, the Power of Cheese" advertising campaign. See id.

at 271 (noting use of compelled assessments).
100. See id. at 266 (describing appellants). The Cochrans decided on their
own how much milk to produce, sell and market. See id. (same). Under the Dairy
Act, all milk producers in the United States must contribute mandatory assessments of fifteen cents per hundredweight of milk sold. See id. (illustrating mechanics of Dairy Act). Milk producers pay these assessments to the "Dairy Board,"
which was created by the order of the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Act.
See id. (same). Under the Act, dissenting milk producers cannot abstain from paying the assessments. See id. (same).
101. See id. at 266-67 (particularizing traditional farming methods). Judge Aldisert, who wrote the opinion of the court, labeled "traditional" farming methods
as less aggressive than large-scale commercial methods. See id. (discussing distinc-
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tional" methods produced "healthier cows, a cleaner environment and superior milk."10 2 They objected to the "Got Milk?" campaign because they
felt that the advertisements projected a message that milk is a generic
product with no distinctions between producers-a message they emphati10 3
cally opposed.
The Cochrans claimed that the forced advertisement subsidy was un10 4
constitutional pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in United Foods.
The Government countered by arguing that the Act was constitutional
under Glickman.10 5 Additionally, the Government contended that the
speech and thus immune
"Got Milk?" advertisements were 1government
06
from First Amendment violations.
The court presented its analytical roadmap, which first addressed
10 7
If the ads were
whether the advertisements were government speech.
not government speech, but rather commercial speech, then the court
would next have to address whether the mandatory assessments violated
10 8
the appellants' First Amendment right to free speech and association.
In weighing the First Amendment implications, the court had to confront
the question of the proper standard of scrutiny to use for compelled commercial speech. 10 9 In the end, the court held that the compelled assessments did not constitute government speech and violated the Cochrans'
First Amendment rights.1 10 In so holding, the court recognized that the
Supreme Court rulings in Glickman and United Foods "severely dilute the
precedential vitality" of the Third Circuit's central holding in Frame, and
that it is no longer good law. 111
In Cochran, the court began its analysis by looking closely at the Glickman and United Foods decisions in order to see "the side on which the axe
tion between traditional and commercial farming methods). "Traditional" methods allow cows more room to graze and the farmers do not use the recombinant
Bovine Growth Hormone (rBGH), a practice considered unhealthy for both the
cow and consumer by farmers like the Cochrans. See id. (same). For more detail
about rBGH, see id. at 267 n.2.
102. Id. at 267.
103. See id. (illuminating Cochrans' main objection to "Got Milk?"
advertisements).
104. See id. (advancing Cochrans' position). For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods, see supra notes 49-62 and accompanying
text.
105. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 267 (arguing that Glickman was correct controlling Supreme Court precedent). The Government averred that the Dairy Act was
"a species of economic regulation that does not violate the First Amendment." Id.
For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Glickman, see supranotes
25-48 and accompanying text.
106. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 267 (presenting government speech argument).
107. See id. at 268 (describing court's analytical process).
108. See id. (laying framework for First Amendment analysis).
109. See id. (noting need to decide upon proper level of scrutiny).
110. See id. (stating holding).
111. See id. (illuminating lack of precedential authority of Frame's primary
holding after Glickman and United Foods).
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must fall." 1 1 2 Looking at the issue through the prism of Glickman and
United Foods, the court felt it was vital to look at the "broader statutory
scheme" behind the Dairy Act.1 13 The court needed to determine
whether the dairy farmers were bound together by statute to "'market
their products according to cooperative rules' for purposes other than advertising, or speech.' 1 4 If they were, then Glickman would control; if they
1 15
were not, then United Foods would control.
The court went on to examine the Dairy Act in detail.1 16 The Dairy
Act's stated purpose was to ensure "an orderly procedure for financing...
and carrying out a coordinated program of promotion" in order to
strengthen the industry.' 17 The Dairy Act was "a stand-alone law" that was
not passed with any other federal regulatory scheme. 118 Pursuant to the
statute, the Secretary of Agriculture created a "Dairy Board" to collect the
mandatory assessments from all United States milk producers in order to
fund the Dairy Promotion Program. 119 Under the Act, the Secretary of
Agriculture's role was to ensure that the Dairy Promotion Program was
120
properly carried out under the Dairy Act.
112. See id. at 268-70 (examining Glickman and United Foods). For a further
discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Glickman and United Foods, see supra
notes 25-62 and accompanying text.
113. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 270 (examining Dairy Act, which, among other
things, presented statutory schemes for promoting agricultural commodities).
This need to look at the broader statutory scheme was in direct response to the
Supreme Court's guidance in Glickman. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997) (stressing importance of statutory scheme).
114. Cochran, 359 F.3d at 270 (quoting United States v. United Foods, 533
U.S. 404, 412 (2001)). For a further discussion of the essential distinction between
Glickman and United Foods, see supra note 58-59 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale for distinguishing between the statutory schemes in Glickman and United Foods, see supranotes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
116. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 270-71 (explaining workings of Dairy Act).
117. Id. at 270 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 4501(b) (2000)) (expounding purpose of
Dairy Act). For examples of similar agricultural check-off programs, see supra
notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
118. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 270 (discussing legislative history of Dairy Act).
119. See id. (explaining logistical aspects of Dairy Act). The Cochrans had to
pay between $3500 and $4000 per year in assessments. Id. $4000 represents about
ten percent of the Cochrans' yearly income. See Edwards, supranote 24 (reporting
financial burdens placed on Cochrans from paying mandatory subsidies). The
court indicated that the Dairy Promotion website stressed that the check-off programs are not a governmental program, funded by taxpayers, but rather "they are
businesses with governmental oversight" that are funded by the dairy producers.
See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 271 (quoting Dairy Promotion Program website).
120. Cochran, 359 F.3d at 271. The Secretary's functions are also funded by
the compelled assessments. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g) (2) (discussing Secretary of Agriculture's oversight functions). The dairy producers actually have control,
through a referendum process, to decide whether the Dairy Promotion Program
will continue. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 271 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 4506(a)) (acknowledging that dairy farmers do have some means for controlling Dairy Promotion
Program).
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Besides the Dairy Act, the industry was "subject to a patchwork of federal and state regulatory laws." 121 The court noted that it was crucial to
examine these other statutes to determine whether Glickman should control the case. 122 The district court below found that through the Dairy Act
and these other statutes, a cooperative arrangement existed, which
12
brought the case within the "rubric of Glickman." 3 The Third Circuit felt
differently because none of these various other laws affected fluid milk
124
producers like the Cochrans.
After outlining the necessary background, the court analyzed the gra12 5
The initial issue
vamen of the appeal-the First Amendment issues.
26
This is an
was whether the Dairy Act constituted government speech.'
issue that the Supreme Court had yet to decide in the context of check-off
127
As noted before, the Third Circuit
programs at the time of this appeal.
already addressed this issue in Frame, deciding that the compelled assess-

121. Cochran, 359 F.3d at 271. Among the relevant laws that the district court
noted were: (1) AMAA, 7 U.S.C. § 608c (2000); (2) the Agriculture Act of 1949, 7
U.S.C. § 1446 (2000); (3) the import control regulations pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202 (2000); and (4) the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2000). See id. at
271-72 (listing federal laws that district court below deemed relevant to analysis).
122. See id. at 272 (announcing importance of analyzing these statutes in conjunction with Dairy Act in order to determine whether cooperative type arrangement exists, like that found in Glickman).
123. See id. (noting district court's rationale).
124. See id. at 272-73 (analyzing why various other federal statutes do not apply to fluid milk producers). Specifically, the AMAA only applied to "handlers" of
milk, and not "producers." See id. at 272 (distinguishing milk "handlers" from
"producers"). The Agriculture Act of 1949 did not apply to producers of "fluid
milk," which was what the Cochrans produced. See id. (explaining why Agriculture
Act of 1949 did not apply). Likewise, the import control regulations did not apply
to "fluid milk." See id. at 272-73 (detailing inapplicability of import controls to
fluid milk producers). Lastly, the Cochrans did not belong to any cooperative allowed by the Capper-Volstead Act. See id. at 273 (explaining that Capper-Volstead
Act, which allows certain dairy producers to enter manufacturing and marketing
cooperatives without violating antitrust laws, does not apply to Cochrans because
Cochrans were not members of such cooperatives).
125. See id. (indicating direction of analysis).
126. See id. (presenting threshold "government speech" issue). For further
detail on the "government speech" doctrine, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
127. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 273 (noting lack of previous Supreme Court guidance in this area). In United Foods, the Supreme Court did not address whether
the compelled speech pursuant to the Mushroom Act was government speech because the government failed to raise the issue in the appellate court. See United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 404, 416-17 (2001) (sidestepping "government speech" issue). The Supreme Court, however, did address this issue this past
term, holding that the analogous check-off program pursuant to the Beef Act was
government speech. SeeJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2061-66
(2005) (stating holding). For more discussion on the current state of this area of
law afterJohanns,see infra notes 156-79 and accompanying text.
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ments of the Beef Act did not constitute government speech. 128 This
holding was consistent with the above-mentioned circuit findings that the
compelled assessments of the respective check-off programs did not garner the label of government speech.' 29 The Third Circuit determined
that the Dairy Promotion Program was "in all material respects the same"
as the Beef Promotion Program under the Beef Act.13 0 Thus, pursuant to
its Frame precedent, the Secretary of Agriculture's oversight of the pro-

gram was "not sufficient to transform the dairy industry's self-help program into 'government speech.'"131 Even though the subsequent
Supreme Court rulings in Glickman and United Foods eviscerated the essential First Amendment holding of Frame, the Third Circuit felt that Frame's
128. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing government
speech analysis by Third Circuit in Frame); see also Cochran, 359 F.3d at 273 (acknowledging that Third Circuit addressed government speech issue in Frame).
129. See Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161-62 (6th
Cir. 2003) (addressing government speech argument in context of subsidies compelled by Pork Act), vacated and remanded by Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S.Ct. 2511 (2005). The Sixth Circuit declined to treat
the compelled subsidies of the Pork Act's check-off program as governmental
speech because the pork industry retained "extensive control" over the promotional activities of the Act. See id. at 161 (discussing rationale). The court raised
three points to support this conclusion: (1) the "primary purpose" of the Act was
to strengthen the pork market; (2) the funding for the program did not come
from the general tax revenue, but from only the mandatory subsidies; and (3) the
government only had limited oversight over the program. See id. at 161-62 (supporting contention that speech in question was not government speech). The
court found the role of the government to be more like a facilitator of private
speech as opposed to actually being the speaker. See id. at 162 ("In sum, the costs
and content of the speech in question are almost completely the responsibility of
members of the pork industry. The First Amendment does not lie dormant merely
because the government acts to consolidate and facilitate speech that is otherwise
wholly private.").
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit recently found that the ads funded by compelled
assessments in the Beef Act, the same statute as analyzed by Third Circuit in Frame,
were not government speech. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 335
F.3d 711, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2003) (conducting government speech analysis), vacated
and remanded yJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005) (rejecting
Eighth Circuit's contention that check-off program was not government speech).
The court stated that this was a case of compelled speech, which is fundamentally
different than governmental speech. See id. at 720 (expounding difference between government speech cases and compelled speech cases); see also Pelts & Skins,
LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 429-32 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that compelled
funding for generic alligator advertisements did not constitute government
speech), vacated and remanded by Landreneau v. Pelts & Skins, LLC, 125 S.Ct. 2511
(2005). For a further discussion on how the Supreme Court refuted the government speech analysis of these multiple circuit courts, see infra notes 156-79.
130. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 274 (finding Beef Promotion Program analogous
to Dairy Promotion Program).
131. Id. Judge Aldisert pointed out that the "government itself describes the
Dairy Promotion Program as a non-governmental program" on the dairy check-off
program website. See id. (supporting conclusion that Dairy Act does not constitute
government speech).
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government speech analysis was still valid precedent.13 2 Hence, the ads
pursuant to the Dairy Act were commercial speech-subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.

133

Per United Foods, the court's next task was to determine whether the
dairy farmers were "'bound together and required by the statute to market
their products according to cooperative rules[,]' for purposes other than
advertising, or speech." 134 The main question was whether the Dairy Act
compelled speech that was ancillary to a broader scheme that could be
classified as "economic regulation," which receives a "'strong presumption
of validity,"' or whether the primary purpose behind the Act was the
speech itself-in other words, whether the Dairy Act was more like Glickman or United Foods.1 35 The circuit held that the Dairy Act was more akin
1 36
to United Foods.
Of significant importance was the fact that even though the dairy industry was "subject to a patchwork of state and federal laws," the Dairy Act
did not force milk farmers to join an association such as a union, state bar
or "the collective enterprise at issue in Glickman."13 7 The court noted that
the Act was a "free-standing promotional program" that was "not ancillary
to any collective enterprise or compelled association with a non-speech
purpose."13 8 Additionally, the court declared that congruous to the Mush139
room Act in United Foods, the Dairy Act's primary purpose was speech.
Finding that the Cochrans' First Amendment rights were implicated, the
140
court then focused on the proper standard of scrutiny.
132. See id. ("Although this court's First Amendment discussion and ultimate
holding inFrame have been abrogated by Glickman and United Foods, none of the
Court's subsequent decisions regarding 'government speech' undermine our analysis of that issue in Frame.").
133. See id. (holding that case at bar was not government speech case and thus
subject to First Amendment review).
134. See id. at 274-75 (explicating next step in analysis) (citations omitted).
For a further discussion of United Foods, see supra notes 49-62 and accompanying
text.
135. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 275 (distilling applicable law). The court noted
that an individual's objection to the speech may be minor yet still violate the First
Amendment. See id. ("' [T] he general rule is that the speaker and the audience,
not the government, assess the value of the information presented.'" (quoting Ed-

enfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))).
136. See id. at 275-76 (explaining rationale).
137. See id. at 275 (distinguishing present case from Glickman). The court felt
that "United Foods made clear that Glickman applied only in circumstances similar to
Abood and Keller." Id. For a further discussion of the Abood/Keller line of cases, see
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
138. Cochran, 359 F.3d at 275.
139. See id. at 276 (analogizing Mushroom Act with Dairy Act); see also id. at
276 n.11 (comparing Congress's declared purpose for both Mushroom Act and
Dairy Act).
140. See id. at 276 (recognizing that free speech and association rights are not
absolute and corresponding need to determine proper standard of scrutiny).
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The Third Circuit characterized the Dairy Act as "compelled commercial speech."1 41 The Supreme Court has not settled on what should be the
proper standard for compelled commercial speech cases and the circuits
are split on the issue. 14 2 The court then listed four current possible tests:
(1) the Central Hudson test; (2) the "germaneness" test from compelled
speech cases; (3) the adaptation of the commercial speech standard; and
(4) the stringent standard for associational rights that the Third Circuit
used in Frame.'43 The Third Circuit then summarized the tests, mentioning that the Supreme Court, in United Foods, did not resolve the question
of whether the Central Hudson test was applicable to compelled commercial
speech cases, and that the United Foods Court instead "seemingly applied
the 'germaneness' test." 144 The Third Circuit followed the Supreme
45
Court's lead and decided to stay clear of the CentralHudson controversy.'
Echoing the sentiments from Judge Sloviter's dissent in Frame, the circuit
court found "that the government's interest in promoting the dairy industry is not sufficiently substantial" to allow the current encroachment on
the Cochrans' First Amendment rights. 146 In this way, the court was able
to hold that there was a First Amendment violation under any level of
scrutiny-including Central Hudson-and that this case is directly analo1 47
gous with United Foods.

141. Id.
142. See id. at 277 (commenting on current unresolved nature of what should
be proper standard for compelled commercial speech cases).
143. See id. (particularizing current variations on standard of scrutiny).

144. See id. at 277-79 (surveying various tests, including uncertain state of Central Hudson test, in context of compelled commercial speech cases after United
Foods decision). For a further discussion of the criticisms and uncertainty of the
validity of the Central Hudson test, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. See
also Brief for Respondents at 43 n.29, Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct.
2055 (2005) (Nos. 03-1164, 03-1165) (focusing attention on uncertain status of
Central Hudson test, even among members of current Supreme Court). The Third
Circuit phrases the Central Hudson test as follows: "(1) the state must 'assert a substantial government interest'; (2) 'the regulatory technique must be in proportion
to that interest'; and (3) the incursion on commercial speech 'must be designed
carefully to achieve the State's goal.'" Cochran, 359 F.3d at 277 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
145. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 279 ("In light of the reluctance of the Supreme
Court in United Foods to enter the controversy over the applicable scrutiny for compelled commercial speech cases .. .we will follow suit.").

146. See id. at 278-79 (refuting contention that government has substantial
enough interest in general health of dairy industry to warrant First Amendment
intrusions). The court felt that the Supreme Court's analysis in United Foods vindicated Judge Sloviter's dissenting opinion in Frame. See id. at 279 (equating United
Foods analysis with Judge Sloviter's analysis in her Frame dissent).

147. See id. at 279-80 ("Measured by any degree of scrutiny set forth in the
foregoing discussion, we conclude that this case runs on all fours with the teachings and holding of United Foods, and accordingly hold that the [Dairy Act] does
not survive the First Amendment Challenge . .
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Judge Rendell issued a concurring opinion. 1 48 She felt that because
the assessments in this case did not "pass muster" under United Foods, there
was no need for the court to determine the extent of the governmental
interest for purposes of the Central Hudson test. 149 She opined that after
50
United Foods, there appears to be a basic two-part inquiryl -first, whether
the plaintiffs are required to be bound together "'to market their products according to cooperative rules,"' and second, whether the compelled
assessments further any other non-speech purpose. 1 5 1 Theoretically, one
may fail the first prong and the compelled assessments may still be permitted if there is a sufficient relationship between the assessments and a valid
non-speech interest (i.e., germane to non-speech purpose) .152 In this
case, however, the Act failed both prongs, so Judge Rendell felt that the
speech was "purely 'compelled speech,' forbidden by United Foods under
any level of scrutiny."115 For this reason, Judge Rendell declared that the
court's discussion about the correct level of scrutiny was unnecessary
dicta. 15 Regardless of this dispute over the proper level of scrutiny, the
central decision of the Third Circuit in Cochran signaled a definite victory
155
in the area of free speech.
IV.

IMPACT

Cochranwas a triumph for the First Amendment.1 56 "The [Third Circuit] made clear that just because an industry is regulated doesn't mean
148. Id. at 280-81 (Rendell,J., concurring).
149. See id. at 280 (Rendell, J., concurring) (finding court's governmental interest analysis unnecessary). Judge Rendell pointed to the fact that the Supreme
Court itself has before cast doubt on the need for "engaging in a Central Hudson
analysis" and that it appears especially unnecessary after United Foods. See id.
(Rendell, J., concurring) (stating same). She averred that the Supreme Court in
UnitedFoods appeared to "explicitly endorse the ... Abood/Keller gernaneness test."
Id. at 280 n.14 (Rendell, J., concurring). She also found the Sixth Circuit's arguments persuasive in Michigan Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 163
(6th Cir. 2003), where the Sixth Circuit rejected using the Central Hudson test for
analyzing the compelled assessments under the Pork Act. See Cochran,359 F.3d at
280 n.15 (Rendell, J., concurring) (approving Sixth Circuit's analysis to analogous
case).
150. See Cochran, 359 F.3d at 281 (Rendell,J., concurring) (commencing twopart inquiry).
151. See id. (Rendell, J., concurring) (specifying prongs of dual inquiry).
152. See id. (Rendell, J., concurring) (hypothesizing potential outcomes
under dual inquiry).
153. See id. (Rendell, J., concurring) (applying facts to dual inquiry).
154. See id. (Rendell, J., concurring) (noting that any analysis of correct level
of scrutiny, given facts of case, was unnecessary).
155. For a discussion of the impact of Cochran, see infra notes 156-79 and
accompanying text.
156. See Shannon P. Duffy, FirstAmendment Fears Curdle 'Got Milk?'Effort, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at 7 (paraphrasing Cochrans' lawyer, Steven Simpson).
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that its members lose their First Amendment rights." 157 In doing so, the
Third Circuitjoined the emerging trend among the circuit courts holding
similar check-off programs unconstitutional. 158 This triumph, however,
was short-lived. 159 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Cochran and
vacated and remanded the decision so that it may be reconsidered in light
of the Court's latest word on check-off programs-Johanns v. Livestock MarketingAss'n.1 60 In that case, decided this past term, the Court held that the
Beef Act is constitutional because it is government speech. 1 6 1 On a collective level, the consequences of Livestock MarketingAss'n are far reachingthe decision sounds a major victory for the United States Department of
Agriculture. 1 62 The omnipresent and contentious check-off program litigation that has pervaded many agricultural sectors is now likely to be set163
fled in the favor of the government.
157. Id. (quoting Cochrans' lawyer, Steven Simpson). Simpson continued by
stating, "[s]peech wouldn't be free if government could require people to convey
officially sanctioned messages. The same principle applies to compelling people
to pay for speech with which they disagree." Id.
158. See Scott Kilman, U.S. Court Rejects Mandatory Levy on Dairy Farmers,WALL
ST.J., Feb. 25, 2004, at D8 ("The ruling is the latest in a string of court decisions to
go against so-called farmer check-off programs that long have funded some of the
best-known generic ad campaigns in the U.S ...... "). Along with the Sixth Circuit,
which struck down the compelled assessments that brings us "Pork: The Other
White Meat," or the Eighth Circuit, which voided the assessments responsible for
"Beef: Its What's for Dinner," the Third Circuit substantiated the cherished First
Amendment rights residing within objecting farmers. See Mich. Pork Producers
Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003) (striking down compelled
assessments pursuant to Pork Act because unconstitutional), vacated and remanded
by Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511
(2005); Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 725-26 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding Beef Act unconstitutional), vacated and remanded byJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005). For details of Michigan Pork Producers
Ass'n, see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
159. SeeJohanns v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2512, 2512 (2005) (vacating and remanding Third Circuit's decision in Cochran in light of Supreme Court's recent
decision declaring Beef Act constitutional).
160. See 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2061-66 (2005) (declaring constitutionality of Beef
Act based on government speech theory). This decision was highly anticipated by
many agricultural industries because of its potential to finally resolve the check-off
controversy one way or the other. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Says Beef Producers
Can Be Forced to Fork Over for Ads, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 2005 (noting that many
similar programs have "'been in disarray and on hold waiting'" for Livestock Marketing Ass'n).
161. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062 ("The message set out in the
beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by the Federal
Government.").
162. See Tony Mauro, High Court Says Beef Is What'sfor Dinner (May 24, 2005),
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=15308 (quoting Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Johanns, as saying " [t] his is certainly a win for the many
producers who recognize the power of pooled resources").
163. See First Amendment Ctr. Online, Quick Look atJohanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (May 24, 2005), at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id=15313&printer-friendly=y ("But this ruling may end most of the liti-
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In Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Supreme Court finally addressed the
government speech argument; the majority found the Beef Act to be government speech, which precluded the need to further analyze the previous standard of scrutiny issues left unresolved by Glickman and United
Foods.16 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the beef
check-off program is so intertwined with the government that it undoubt65
This holding rejected the growing
edly qualifies as government speech.'
pursuant to check-off proconsensus among circuit courts that speech
1 66
grams is not actually government speech.
The majority did leave open the potential for future as-applied challenges to check-off programs; courts may hold the programs unconstitutional if the resulting advertisements are attributed to individual
producers. 1 67 An as-applied challenge, however, was not possible in Livestock MarketingAss'n because the majority felt the tag line included in the
beef industry advertisements-"funded by America's Beef Producers"168
That decision
was too broad to be attributed to any single producer.
the
Dairy Act on
of
consideration
Circuit's
will likely instruct the Third
gation in favor of the government programs. By regarding these marketing programs for the first time as government speech, the Court may have effectively
taken them off the First Amendment playing field.").
164. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2058 (2005) (presenting issue of
this appeal and how it differs from previous reviews of check-off programs). Justice Scalia succinctly framed up the issue as follows:
For the third time in eight years, we consider whether a federal program
that finances generic advertising to promote an agricultural product violates the First Amendment. In these cases, unlike the previous two, the
dispositive question is whether the generic advertising at issue is the Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny.
Id. at 2058.
165. See id. at 2062 ("The message set out in the beef promotions is from
beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government."). Of significant importance to the Court was the Secretary of Agriculture's extensive oversight of the program. See id. (describing Secretary's inclusive role, specifically
addressing duties such as appointing members of Board and approving or rejecting promotional campaigns). Although the Secretary has lots of interaction
with the beef industry throughout the entire process, many still felt holding the
program as government speech contrasted with the original understanding of the
program, which was to have the private industry regulate itself. SeeJosh Flory, Some

ProducersHave a Beef with Court's Checkoff Ruling, COLUMBIA

DAILY TRIBUNE,

May 24,
4

2005, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/2005/May/2005052 News
003.asp (noting critic's complaint that check-off programs were supposed to be
run and controlled by producers).
166. For further discussion on the Third Circuit's position, along with the
position of other circuit courts, on government speech in the context of check-off
programs, see supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
167. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, at 2065 n.8 (voicing concern that paid advertisements should not be attributed to individual plaintiffs, or else analysis would be
different).
168. See id. at 2065-66 (finding that tag line was not specific enough to attribute advertisement to any specific producer and, thus, preventing different
analysis).
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remand because many of the dairy advertisements have a similar tag line
that states, "funded by America's Dairy Producers."1 69
Notably, the Court's holding in Livestock MarketingAss'n was not unan-

imous; Justice Souter filed a thoughtful dissent to which Justices Stevens
and Kennedy joined. 170 Justice Souter felt that in order for the government to garner the protection of the government speech doctrine, it must
make itself politically accountable by clearly "indicating that the content
actually is a government message."1 7 1 Because many of the beef industry
advertisements include the tag line "funded by America's Beef Producers,"
Justice Souter worried that the average layperson reading the advertise172
ments would not readily associate them with the federal government.
Given

the Supreme Court decision in Livestock Marketing Ass'n,

Cochran will advance freedom of speech much less than desired. 173 By
holding the Beef Act constitutional, the Court effectively closed the door
on facial challenges to similar check-off programs.1 74 Still, Cochran did
have an identifiable impact-it helped to pressure the High Court into
delivering some needed lucidity to the area of agricultural check-off programs. 175 For many, this lucidity is not worth the associated free speech
169. See U.S. Supreme Court Vacates 'Got Milk?'Decision; Remands to 3rd U.S. Circuitfor FurtherProceedings (May 31, 2005), at http://www.ij.org/first-amendment/
gotmilk/5_31_05pr.html (noting that Dairy Act is usually attributed to "America's

Dairy Farmers").
170. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2068-72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's holding that Beef Act is government speech).
171. Id. at 2069 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 2072 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explicating by way of analogy that
average person would not think beef ads were spoken on behalf of government).
Justice Souter, in a colorful passage, expressed his concerns that the government is
not being held accountable and thus should not be cloaked with government
speech protection. He stated the following:
But the tag line just underscores the point that would be true without it,
that readers would most naturally think that ads urging people to have
beef for dinner were placed and paid for by the beef producers who stand
to profit when beef is on the table. No one hearing a commercial for
Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking behind the curtain.
Why would a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to
make him eat more steak? Given the circumstances, it is hard to see why
anyone would suspect the Government was behind the message unless
the message came out and said so.
Id. at 2072 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. See Inst. For Justice, I Speaks Out Against Government-Compelled Speech in
Beef Case (May 23, 2005), at http://www.ij.org/first-amendment/got-milk/5_23_
05pr.html (declaring that free speech "suffered a setback" as result of Supreme
Court's Beef Act ruling).
174. See Michael Doyle, Farmers Must Pay for Ads: High Court Upholds Beef Industry's Mandatory Fees (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/
politics/v-print/story/12945658p-13793344c.html (stating that Livestock Marketing
Ass'n decision will stop further challenges to these type of programs in future).
175. See Thomas Goldstein, The Upcoming 2004-2005 Term, 2004 CATO Sup. Cr.
REv. 493, 495 (2004) (noting that Court had "opportunity to bring further clarity"
to this confused area of law by hearing check-off program appeal).
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setback because they had hoped that the Third Circuit's decision in
Cochran, coupled with the concordant sister circuit decisions, would persuade the Court to move further away from its restrictive decision in Glickman-a precedent that some speculated the Supreme Court itself had
begun to discredit.1 7 6 Unfortunately, the decision in Livestock Marketing
Ass'n dashed those hopes. It now seems that practical economic considerations will rule the day over the free speech rights that many circuit courts,
including the Third Circuit, defended adamantly. 77 By labeling such
check-off programs as government speech, the Supreme Court appeared
to contradict the original understanding behind the use of such programs.17 8 Accordingly, it is evident that some of the most popular advertising campaigns in history will remain intact rather than relegated to the
179
ashes of advertising history.
Jaret N. Gronczewski
176. See Michael Doyle, Growing Controversy: Courts Look at PromotionalFees That
Many Farmers Must Pay, FRESNO BEE, June 8, 2004, at C1 ("[S]ome attorneys ...
believe the Court's majority has begun abandoning its [Glickman] reasoning and
adopted a more skeptical view of all promotion programs."). The article then
quoted Justice Carlos Moreno, of the California Supreme Court, as saying: " ' The
United States Supreme Court appears to have distanced itself from [Glickman].'"
Id. The Glickman decision has received much scholarly criticism over the years.
See, e.g.,
Fox, supra note 6, at 433 (advancing scholarly criticism of Glickman);
Schoen et al., supra note 39, at 497-503 (describing "First Amendment shortcomings" of Glickman). Actually, the Court was able to resolve the issue without having
to further disturb the already murky waters of both Glickman and United Foods. See
Mauro, supra note 162 (quoting California agricultural group representative as saying Supreme Court's analysis was "clean way to resolve" currently chaotic area of
litigation).
177. See Tony Mauro, supra note 162 (noting practical concerns grounding
government speech doctrine rationale and how Supreme Court extended that rationale to check-off context). In all, if the Court decided the other way the potential total demise of the check-off system could have cost up to $700 million
removed from the annual marketing economy. See Edwards, supra note 24 (quantifying potential costs if all check-off programs were voided). As an example of the
negative monetary impact that striking a check-off statute may have, Edwards detailed the decimated state of the Mushroom Council marketing budget after the
United Foods decision. See id. (exhibiting current barren state of Mushroom Council's ad budget).
178. See Flory, supra note 165 ("[C]heckoff programs were supposed to be
producer-run and producer-controlled and.., producers will be shocked to learn
that the checkoff is simply another government program."). For a further discussion on how producers may not agree with the Supreme Court's government
speech characterization, see supra note 165. See also supra note 131 (describing
how Dairy Promotion Program website itself labeled check-off program as nongovernmental program).
179. See First Amendment Ctr. Online, supra note 163 ("By regarding these
marketing programs for the first time as government speech, the Court may have
effectively taken them off the First Amendment playing field. Pending cases involving promotion programs for pork, milk, cotton and other products, will likely
be resolved under this new framework.").
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